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Great Strategic Rivalries: From the Classical World
to the Cold War, ed. James G. Lacey. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2016. 680 pages. $47.95.

Edited by James Lacey of the Marine
Corps War College, this collection’s
sixteen essays explore prolonged
strategic rivalries, beginning with
Athens, Sparta, and the Peloponnesian
War, and ending with the Cold War
rivalry between the Soviet Union and
the United States. Each essay explores
a rivalry’s nature and causes, the
reasons it endured, how it ended, and
its legacy. While some revisit welltrodden ground, such as Paul A. Rahe’s
discussion of the Peloponnesian War,
others offer interesting new insights.
Sally Paine’s analysis of the three-sided
struggle among China, Japan, and Russia
for regional dominance highlights the
importance of developing civic and economic institutions to support military
power, conducting long-term planning,
securing allies, and focusing on the right
enemies. Nineteenth-century China
failed to do any of these, and reaped the
consequences in a succession of military
defeats and “unequal treaties.” Chinese
leaders went to war with Britain and
France—distant powers that posed little
threat to China—instead of focusing on
nearby and more dangerous Russia.
Kathleen M. Burk’s impressive essay
on Great Britain and the United States
illuminates a multifaceted rivalry
that involved both cooperation and
competition and was often more
commercial than military. Its slow,
peaceful end in the twentieth century
made it particularly unusual, as British
leaders urged the United States to
assume primary responsibility for
regions critical to British security.
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In contrast, Christine Shaw’s analysis
of Genoa and Venice demonstrates
that commercial rivalries can be quite
bloody, involving not only conventional
military operations but raids on trade
quarters in foreign ports and piracy.
Despite their bitter rivalry, Genoa
and Venice too sometimes fought the
same enemies, as when both joined the
Holy League to fight the Ottomans.
Kenneth W. Harl’s analysis of the long
rivalry between Rome and the Parthians
and Persians underlines geography’s
enduring influence. Defeat of one
enemy can pave the way for a new,
more powerful one, such as Sassanid
Persia. The Ottoman Turks, in turn,
inherited Byzantium and Rome’s
rivalry with Persia, and faced the same
strategic problem of securing borders
and waging war in an arid region.
Kelly R. DeVries explores the role of
secondary powers in these rivalries
by examining Anglo-French rivalry
during the Middle Ages. Maintaining
the wool trade required English rulers
to support rebellions and wars by the
Low Countries against France, the Holy
Roman Empire, and Spain. Similarly,
English campaigning focused on securing and defending the port of Calais so
England could control both ends of the
wool trade. Hoping to weaken England,
Scotland and Wales aided France.
Matt Schumann and Michael V.
Leggiere cover the later stages of the
Anglo-French rivalry, in which Britain
prevailed owing to superior economic
and maritime power, though not without
committing substantial troops to
fight on the European continent. Like
DeVries, both authors adroitly blend
discussions of military and economic
factors. Leggiere’s cost-benefit analysis
of Napoleon’s Continental System

1

2/23/18 10:51 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 2, Art. 14

and its effect on global trade is particularly thorough and well argued.
Troubled by distance, information
overload, and numerous local rivals
to their scattered holdings, the Hapsburgs, Geoffrey Parker notes, were
almost always at war, often in different
places against different enemies. Their
empire’s status as the leading Catholic
power further complicated the strategic
situation and influenced important
strategic decisions. Despite the logistical
and operational problems the Spanish
Armada faced, Philip II believed that
divine favor would bring it victory
against England. Religion often proved
less an obstacle to the Hapsburgs’ rivals,
as demonstrated by France’s alliance
with the Ottoman Empire, which
Andrew Wheatcroft’s essay details.
Geoffrey Wawro, Williamson Murray,
William M. Morgan, Robert M. Citino,
and James H. Anderson, respectively, explore more-recent rivalries: France versus Germany, Britain versus Germany,
the United States versus Japan, Germany
versus Russia, and the United States
versus the Soviet Union. Citino places
the Nazi-Soviet pact in the historical
context of earlier partitions of Poland
and argues that “German-Russian
strategic rivalry was the real and proximate cause of World War I” (p. 465).
Lacey’s introduction ties the essays
together and highlights their commonalities, such as the economic and
financial systems needed to support
protracted rivalries. Rivalries often begin
and end with shocks to the international
system, such as the rise of new powers
or the collapse of old ones; examples
include the Athenian-Spartan rivalry
that arose after the Persian threat to
Greece receded and the long-standing
Anglo-French rivalry that ended when
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Germany arose as a new threat to both
nations. Fear, honor, and interest—
categories introduced by Thucydides
in his history of the Peloponnesian
War—cause rivalries to endure.
Strategic rivalry is a topic worthy of
more research, particularly since, as
Lacey notes, disputes between enduring
rivals are twice as likely to lead to war
as disputes between nations without
a history of rivalry. The breadth and
depth of this book’s essays make it an
excellent choice for a course text.
STEPHEN K. STEIN

Churchill & Orwell: The Fight for Freedom, by
Thomas E. Ricks. New York: Penguin, 2017. 352
pages. $28.

George Orwell and Winston S. Churchill
do not strike us as two men whose
surnames would share a dust jacket.
One only has to look at David Levine’s
clever caricatures in the New York
Review of Books for two entirely different
men to appear: Orwell the rustic, in
tweeds, chewing on a piece of hay; and
Churchill, clad in coronation robes,
the king of his own dominion. Yet
Thomas Ricks, a journalist formerly
at the Washington Post, has written
an interesting book, a dual biography
of sorts that claims that the men had
much in common as they fought
fascism and Communism, two of the
greatest evils of the twentieth century.
Ricks focuses on the “fulcrum” years
of Orwell’s and Churchill’s lives—the
1930s and 1940s. And this is just as
well, because if they had died before
1940 they would be remembered little
today, if at all. A sniper’s bullet almost
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